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Managed Cooperation in a Post-Sago 
Mine Disaster World 
 
Patrick R. Baker* 
 
I. Introduction to the Case Backlog: How Did We Arrive at Impasse? 
 
The Sago Mine disaster in West Virginia caused the tragic deaths of 
twelve coal miners on January 2, 2006.1 The nation became enthralled by 
the epic struggle for life and death, as rescuers attempted to free the thir-
teen trapped miners, only to learn that there was one survivor.2 Following 
the accident, a federal and state investigation ensued and found that the 
mine operators received numerous safety violations before the disaster.3 
As the public became enraged over the lack of regulatory enforcement, 
Congressional hearings soon followed.4 
The Sago Mine disaster sparked substantive legislative reforms and 
regulatory changes, and the industry, miners, and regulators witnessed 
the first major changes to mine safety in over thirty years.5 The Mine 
Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (“New Miner 
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ulty, he practiced at the law offices of Penn, Stuart & Eskridge in Abingdon, Virginia, 
where he represented the mineral and energy industry in a wide array of litigation issues. 
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sor of Law Douglas McKechnie as well as St. Louis University Associate Professor of 
Law Samuel Jordan for their insight, time, and patience. Finally, I want to thank my re-
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1. Patrick R. Baker, The American Coal Miner, The Forgotten Natural Resource: 
Why Legislative Reforms are a Viable Solution to Solving the Case Backlog Before the 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission Sparked by Tougher Enforcement of 
New Coal Mining Health and Safety Laws and Regulations, 13 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 141, 142 
(2011) (citing RICHARD A. GATES ET AL., MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: NO. 46-08791, at 1 (2006)). 
2. Id. (citing GATES ET AL., supra note 1). 
3. Id. (citing Editorial, Lessons from the Big Branch Tragedy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 
2010, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/14/opinion/14wed2.html). 
4. LINDA LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RL 34429, COAL MINE SAFETY AND 
HEALTH 2 (2008). 
5. Baker, supra note 1. 
1
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Act”),6 was signed into law on June 15, 2006.7 President George W. 
Bush pledged that “[w]e make this promise to American miners and their 
families: We’ll do everything possible to prevent mine accidents and 
make sure you’re able to return safely to your loved ones.”8 
The new law escalated penalties for safety violations, required the 
industry to install emergency underground shelters and new communica-
tion devices,9 and mandated new guidelines for flame retardant equip-
ment.10 The new legislation focused primarily on oversight, enforcement, 
post-accident safety technology, and accident response, but did little to 
address accident prevention.11 While the stakeholders argued over the 
new law’s effectiveness and broad reforms, the law was enacted with lit-
tle consideration about how court challenges to the new legislation would 
likely increase. What no one seemed to recognize or appreciate was the 
voluminous surge in legal challenges to the New Miner Act that would 
soon follow. 
The Mine Health and Safety Administration (“MSHA”), which is a 
division of the Department of Labor (“DOL”), is charged with enforcing 
the New Miner Act.12 A review of MSHA’s litigation statistics provides 
a glimpse into this complex problem: in 2007, a total of 130,131 viola-
tions were assessed against coal operators and 19,578 of those violations 
were contested, equaling a fifteen percent challenge rate.13 In 2008, oper-
 
6. Pub. L. No. 109-236, 120 Stat. 493. 
7. Id. 
8. Brian Naylor, Mine Deaths Stir New Debate on Federal Oversight, NPR (Apr. 
27, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126289636. 
9. Mike Lillis, Failed Mining Reform Bill Might Have Prevented Tragedy, WASH. 
INDEP. (Apr. 14, 2010 6:00 AM), http://washingtonindependent.com/82129/failed-
mining-reform-bill-might-have-prevented-tragedy. “[O]nly [fourteen percent] of mines 
have complied with [the New Miner] Act requirements to install improved communica-
tion systems. Mark Guarino, West Virginia Disaster: Will Congress Take on Coal Mining 
Companies? CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 7, 2010, 6:10 PM), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0407/West-Virginia-disaster-Will-Congress-take-
on-coal-mining-companies. Only thirty-four of 491 coal mines have complied with the 
2006 mandate requiring installation of “improved communication systems, such as two-
way wireless devices that can talk with and locate trapped miners . . . .” Id. 
10. See Lillis, supra note 9. 
11. Id. 
12. 29 U.S.C. § 557a (2006). The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 
Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290, is the name of the original act, which was amended by 
the New Miner Act. Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-236, § 2, 120 Stat. 493, 493. 
13. See MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NUMBER OF 
PENALTIES ASSESSED AND PERCENT CONTESTED: JANUARY 2007 – DECEMBER 2011 (2012) 
[hereinafter PENALTIES ASSESSED], available at 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/1
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ators were assessed 198,605 violations and 47,034 were contested, yield-
ing a 23.7% rate of appeal.14 Thus, the Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Review Commission (“Commission”), an independent adjudicative body 
that provides both trial and appellate review of legal disputes arising un-
der the Mine and New Miner Act,15 endured an increase of 870 basis 
points in court challenges from fifteen percent in 2007 to 23.7% in 
2008.16 By 2009, MSHA assessed a total of 173,705 violations and 
47,363 were contested before the Commission.17 Violations dropped in 
2010 to 166,366, but operators still challenged 45,005 of them.18 The 
Commission received some relief in 2011 when the number of violations 
was reduced to 149,744 and operators only contested 37,545 or 25.1%.19 
At first glance it appears that court challenges are decreasing, but 
converting violations into monetary penalties tells a different story. In 
2005, MSHA assessed $28,100,000 in penalties against operators, and in 
2006, operators were assessed $42,800,000 in penalties.20 Civil penalties 
increased to $74,431,611 in 2007 and $193,291,971 in 2008, a 688% in-
crease from 2005.21 In 2009, civil penalties retreated to $139,835,600 
and $133,761,974 in 2010.22 However, in 2011, penalties increased to 
$152,370,691.23 While assessed violations and court challenges may be 
temporarily on the decline, the amount of penalty dollars assessed in-
creased in 2011, and therefore, operators still have a clear incentive to 
contest violations. As a former MSHA official stated, “[i]f operators are 
 
http://www.msha.gov/stats/ContestedCitations/Civil%20Penalties%20Assessed%20and%
20Contested.pdf. 
14. See id. 
15. See 30 U.S.C. § 823(d) (2006). 
16. See PENALTIES ASSESSED, supra note 13. 
17. Id. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. 
20. See MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, MSHA FACT 
SHEET: TOTAL DOLLAR AMOUNT ASSESSED: COAL AND METAL/NON METAL MINES 2002-
2011 (2012), available at 
http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/FactSheets/MSHAbytheNumbers/CalendarYear/Asse
ssments%20data.pdf. Violation and appeal statistics are not available on MSHA’s web-
site before 2007. MSHA does provide the total amount of dollars assessed against coal 
mines from 2002-2011. However, MSHA’s data reporting total dollars assessed and con-
tested does not match the statistics provided at former citation. See PENALTIES ASSESSED, 
supra note 13. 
21. See PENALTIES ASSESSED, supra note 13. 
22. See id. 
23. See id. 
3
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not contesting, penalties are not high enough.”24 Based on the case back-
log, the increased penalties are clearly “high enough.”25 
From 2000 through 2005, an average of 2307 cases were filed each 
year with the Commission.26 However, that number increased after the 
passage of the New Miner Act. In 2010, 11,087 cases were filed, and in 
2011, 10,593 new cases were filed.27 In 2011, the Commission began the 
year with 18,170 cases.28 In comparison, the average trial-level caseload 
from 2000 through 2004 was only 1379.29 As the number of cases has 
increased, frustration and delay with the system has skyrocketed.30 In the 
end, the system teeters on collapse from its own weight.31 
This article proposes a Commission mandated mediation process 
that will offer a solution to the case backlog that prevents regulatory cap-
ture while promoting managed cooperation and communication toward a 
common goal: safety. While the Commission has implemented new 
rules, procedures, and steps that have helped the backlog, these im-
provements have only addressed the symptoms and not the cause. Cur-
rently, the solutions have focused on how to reduce the case backlog, in-
stead of creating a system that allows for communication and 
cooperation, while ensuring compliance and safety. While there has been 
disagreement as to whether or not the case backlog undermines miner 
safety,32 it only seems logical that a system premised upon litigation, de-
 
24. MICHAEL T. HEENAN, WHAT ABOUT THAT CASE BACKLOG? 1 (2010). 
25. Id. 
26. FED. MINE SAFETY & HEALTH REVIEW COMM’N, PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT AND FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS 1, 2 (2011) [hereinafter INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT AND FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS], available at http://www.fmshrc.gov/par11.pdf. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 2. 
29. Id. 
30. See Judith E. Rivlin, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, United Mine Workers of Am., The 
Civil Penalty Case Backlog at the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission: 
What’s to be Done?, Address Before the Energy & Mineral Law Foundation Special In-
stitute on Mine Safety and Health Law (Mar. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Rivlin Address], 
available at 
http://www.emlf.org/Content/images/Speakers_Mine_Safety/1.%20Civil%20Penalty%20
Case%20Backlog/1.C.-Rivlin.FMSHRC.Backlog.pdf. 
31. See id. 
32. Id. at 1 n.1 (“On February 23, 2010, the House of Representatives’ Committee 
on Education and Labor held a Hearing on ‘Reducing the Backlog of Contested Mine 
Safety Cases,’ Cecil Roberts, President of the United Mine Workers of America, asserted 
the case backlog at the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission adversely 
affects miners’ health and safety, while Bruce Watzman, Senior Vice President for Regu-
latory Affairs of the National Mining Association, contended the operators’ enhanced 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/1
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lay, and frustration does little to enhance safety.33 While there have not 
been any formal studies linking the case backlog to unsafe working con-
ditions, the goal of any civil penalty system should be compliance, not 
litigation.34 
The split-enforcement model was adopted to prevent regulatory cap-
ture and ensure mine safety,35 and while some level of adversarial pro-
ceedings is healthy to preclude capture, it also stands to reason that too 
much litigation could be equally detrimental. Thus, it is simply illogical 
to think that all forms of cooperation and communication between the 
regulated and regulator are detrimental and promote malfeasance. In-
stead, the regulator and regulated should be able to work together and 
avoid unnecessary litigation and delay. Ideally, the regulated and regula-
tor should work together toward the common goal of safety. While this 
theory is simply not always possible, simply abandoning it or demoniz-
ing it in every case is equally imprudent. Therefore, this question should 
be posed: Can a system or procedure be created that ensures compliance, 
but also allows for communication and collaboration? The answer is 
“yes” and one realistic solution is mandatory mediation. 
Finally, it is worth noting that while there are numerous Dispute 
System Designs (“DSDs”), the following arguments will primarily focus, 
and be premised on only one option: a DSD adopted by a third-party, the 
Commission, for the benefits of the disputants, MSHA and the operator. 
In the end, a procedural process that provides for managed cooperation 
and compliance toward safer working conditions will reduce the case 
backlog, benefit the parties, and most importantly, improve safety. 
 
II. An In Depth Examination of Mine Safety and Health 
Legislation36 
 
State, local, and federal laws have regulated the mining industry for 
over a century. When Congress created the Bureau of Mines within the 
Department of the Interior in 1910, it implemented the first comprehen-
 
contest rate does not jeopardize miners’ health and safety.”). 
33. Id. at 1. 
34. Id. 
35. See George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclu-
sions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315 (1987). 
36. See Baker, supra note 1, at 146-52, for a more thorough review of the history of 
mine safety and health legislation. 
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sive federal legislation in the country.37 However, it would take almost 
seventy years before Congress would address almost a complete lack of 
miner safety legislation. Between 1967 and 1968, a series of mine disas-
ters took the lives of 533 miners,38 igniting public outrage and prompting 
immediate action from Congress.39 
In 1969, Congress took its first proactive step in regulating safety 
within the mining industry when it enacted the Federal Coal Mine Health 
and Safety Act (“1969 Coal Act”).40 The 1969 Coal Act broadened the 
Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration’s (“MESA”) power and 
authority to inspect mines, to increase frequency of inspections within 
hazardous operations, and to shut down hazardous areas within mines.41 
Although this legislation addressed some mine safety issues, it had lim-
ited effectiveness because it did not prevent regulatory capture.42 
In 1977, Congress passed the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act,43 
(“the Mine Act”) which created the Mine Safety and Health Administra-
tion (“MSHA”) to replace MESA as the agency charged with enforce-
ment of the Act.44 Most notably, the Act created a split-enforcement 
model, which authorized the Department of Labor and MSHA to enforce 
safety and health standards.45 However, disputes arising between MSHA 
and operators would then be adjudicated before the Commission.46 
Over the next thirty years, advances in engineering, technology, and 
safety, and an emerging collaborative relationship between MSHA and 
the mining industry, created a safer workplace for miners.47 For example, 
in 2005 there were only twenty-three coal-related deaths in the United 
 
37. H.R. Rep. No. 91-563, at 2 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2503, 2504. 
38. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2505. 
39. See Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 
1290 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (2006)). 
40. Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (1969). 
41. S. REP. NO. 95-181, at 1-6 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3401-
06. 
42. Id. at 44, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3444. 
43. Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-
962 (2006)). 
44. S. REP. NO. 95-181, at 5, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3405. 
45. 30 U.S.C. § 811(a) (2006). 
46. Id. 
47. Mark E. Heath & Timothy D. Houston, Increased Enforcement and Higher 
Penalties Under the MINER Act: Do They Improve Worker Safety?, in 30 ENERGY AND 
MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 301, 302 (Energy & Mineral Law 
Found. ed., 2009). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/1
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States, a record low.48 Reflective of this collaborative relationship was 
the consensus among industry and MSHA that emphasizing technology 
and corporate safety over profits created safer mines.49 
However, on January 2, 2006, only one of thirteen coal miners sur-
vived a tragic underground explosion at the Sago Mine in West Virginia, 
which had received multiple safety violations prior to the disaster.50 Less 
than three weeks later,51 machinery malfunctions at West Virginia’s 
Aracoma Alma Mine Number One resulted in two more fatalities.52 Ap-
proximately four months later, an underground explosion at Darby Mine 
Number One in Harlan County, Kentucky took the lives of five addition-
al miners.53 These three disasters within such a short time frame forced 
Congress to once again overhaul safety laws and regulations.54 As one 
former MSHA official stated, “it’s unfortunate it took a disaster to bring 
renewed attention to the issue. ‘That’s the history of coal mining legisla-
tion in the U.S.–it’s always born out of disaster and as it’s said the safety 
laws are written with the blood of miners. That’s what it takes.’”55 
Congress enacted the New Miner Act on June 15, 2006.56 The law 
required individual mines to develop Emergency Response Plans 
(“ERPs”), which significantly increased both preventative and post-
accident safety measures.57 Additionally, the Act required the National 
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”) to analyze the 
costs and benefits of refuge chambers,58 and the Technical Study Panel 
(“TSP”) to research and report on various functions of conveyor belts in 
underground mining.59 The Act significantly increased civil and criminal 
 
48. MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, COAL MINING 
FATALITIES BY STATE BY CALENDAR YEAR (2012), available at 
http://www.msha.gov/stats/charts/coalbystates.pdf. 
49. Heath & Houston, Increased Enforcement and Higher Penalties Under the 
MINER Act: Do They Improve Worker Safety?, in ENERGY AND MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 
ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 47, at 302. 
50. GATES ET AL., supra note 1, at 1. 
51. KENNETH A. MURRAY ET AL., MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: NO. 46-08801 1 (2006). 
52. Id. at 2. 
53. Id. 
54. Underground Coal Mining Disasters and Fatalities – United States, 1900-2006, 
CDC (Jan. 2, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5751a3.htm. 
55. Naylor, supra note 8. 
56. Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act (MINER Act), Pub. L. 
No. 109-236, § 1, 120 Stat. 493, 493 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 801 (2006)). 
57. New Miner Act § 2. 
58. Id. § 13. 
59. Id. § 11. 
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penalties.60 Also, MSHA promulgated several regulations increasing 
penalties and creating new types of violations.61 
On April 5, 2010, just four years after the New Miner Act became 
law, the tragic deaths of twenty-nine miners at the Upper Big Branch 
Mine (“UBB”) in West Virginia reintroduced the public and lawmakers 
to the need for more oversight.62 UBB received 124 safety violations in 
2010 prior to the explosion, dozens of which related to improper ventila-
tion.63 In fact, in 2009, Massey Energy Company (“Massey”), operator of 
the UBB, challenged seventy-eight percent of its assessed safety viola-
tions.64 After the UBB explosion, Massey attempted to lessen public and 
political scrutiny by writing to the Governors of Kentucky, West Virgin-
ia, Virginia, and Illinois, alleging that MSHA’s regulations played a role 
in the explosion.65 The company’s CEO, Don Blankenship,66 emphasized 
Massey’s position when he stated the company had “developed grave 
and serious concerns about the MSHA imposed ventilation system em-
ployed at UBB.”67 
In a press release following the Governor’s Independent Investiga-
tion Panel’s report (“GIIP”), which provided insight into the cause of the 
UBB explosion,68 MSHA countered Massey’s position, stating the UBB 
 
60. Id. § 8. 
61. See Criteria and Procedures for Proposed Assessment of Civil Penalties, 30 
C.F.R. §§ 100.3, 100.5 (2012). 
62. David Zucchino & Kim Geiger, Mine Operator Accused of Abusing Safety Ap-
peals Process, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/28/nation/la-na-mine-safety-20100428. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Tim Huber, Massey Says Feds Require Unsafe Mine Ventilation, SEATTLE 
TIMES (June 8, 2010, 10:33 AM), 
http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2012059396_apusmineexplosionmassey
letter.html. 
66. The embattled, and often controversial CEO, stepped down on December 3, 
2010, due to board and public pressure. Clifford Krauss, Under Fire Since Explosion, 
Mining C.E.O. Quits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2010, at B7, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/04/business/energy-environment/04massey.html?_r=0. 
67. Letter from Don L. Blankenship, Chairman & CEO, Massey Energy Co., to 
Steven L. Beshear, Governor, State of Ky., Joseph Manchin, III, Governor, State of W. 
Va., Robert F. McDonnell, Governor, State of Va., & Patrick J. Quinn, III, Governor, 
State of Ill. (June 7, 2010), available at 
http://wvgazette.com/static/coal%20tattoo/Don%20Blankenship%20to%20governors%20
UBB%20June%207%202010.pdf. 
68. See J. DAVITT MCATEER ET AL., UPPER BIG BRANCH, THE APRIL 5, 2010, 
EXPLOSION: A FAILURE OF BASIC COAL MINE SAFETY PRACTICES (2011), available at 
http://media.npr.org/documents/2011/may/giip-massey-report.pdf. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/1
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disaster was “entirely preventable.”69 The GIIP report claimed that Mas-
sey failed to address known compliance issues,70 ignored basic safety 
practices,71 and fostered a corporate culture that “placed the drive to pro-
duce above worker safety.”72 The report identified that faulty water 
sprayers caused the explosion when they ignited built-up methane gas-
es.73 MSHA stated that it largely agreed with the GIIP report and claimed 
that it “echoes many of [sic] findings that MSHA ha[d] been sharing with 
victims’ families and the public.”74 
Although the UBB and subsequent mine disasters have propelled 
Congress to increase regulation, political deadlock has prevented at least 
three proposed pieces of legislation from passing: the Robert C. Byrd 
Miner Safety and Health Act of 2010 in the House75 and the Senate’s 
Robert C. Byrd Miner Safety and Health Act of 2010.76 After the Sen-
ate’s version of the bill failed, it was reintroduced to the 112th Congress 
as S. 153; however, this legislation also failed.77 
All three pieces of legislation called for more oversight, more en-
forcement, and higher penalties. For example, H.R. 5663 called for a 
separate investigation team in accidents with at least three deaths,78 and 
increased civil penalties, and personal and criminal liability.79 H.R. 5663 
also increased MSHA’s enforcement authority by targeting mines that 
have a history of repeated violations80 and by expanding its consideration 
of any violations of the Mine Act,81 compared to the current narrower 
consideration of health and safety violations.82 However, the legislation 
 
69. See Press Release, Mine Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, State-
ment by MSHA Assistant Secretary Joseph A. Main on the Release of Upper Big Branch 
Independent Investigation Report (May 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/msha/MSHA20110767.htm. 
70. See MCATEER ET AL., supra note 68, at 73. 
71. See id. at 108. 
72. See id. at 99. 
73. See id. at 73. 
74. Joseph Main, MSHA Chief on UBB Independent Report Findings, DEP’T. OF 
LABOR (May 19, 2011), http://social.dol.gov/blog/msha-chief-on-ubb-independent-report-
findings/. 
75. H.R. 5663, 111th Cong. (2010). 
76. S. 3671, 111th Cong. (2010). 
77. S. 153, 112th Cong. (2011). 
78. H.R. 5663 §101. 
79. Id. § 302. 
80. Id. § 202. 
81. Id. § 201 
82. 30 U.S.C. § 814(a) (2006). 
9
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substantially failed to address the paramount issue of the case backlog. 
Increased regulation and penalties appear to be Congress’s primary 
solution to improving mine safety; however, it has been argued that this 
singular approach is not sufficient.83 For instance, the National Mining 
Association supports the latter position, stating “[r]egulations alone are 
not sufficient to see continued improvement”84 and “a more cooperative 
relationship between the industry and its regulators” is the solution to 
protecting the lives of miners.85 
Perhaps one of the few issues on which both industry and regulators 
agree, is the limited number of alternatives to reducing the case backlog 
before the Commission.86 Industry takes the position that the case back-
log is due to undertrained MSHA investigators who improperly or incon-
sistently apply the law.87 However, federal regulators reject this view and 
have no intention of retreating from industry pressure.88 These en-
trenched positions and perpetual stalemate illustrate the need that some 
level of collaboration is needed between federal regulators and the min-
ing industry. 
 
 
83. Ian Urbina, Authorities Vow to Close Mines Found to Be Unsafe, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 28, 2010, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/us/28mine.html. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Hal Quinn, Letter to the Editor, Backlog of Mining Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 
2010), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F07E1DF163CF937A35750C0A9669D
8B63. 
87. Halimah Abdullah, Committee Accuses Mining Industry of Slowing Safety Sanc-
tion Process, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (Feb. 23, 2010), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/02/23/87764/committee-accuses-mining-
industry.html. 
88. Hilda L. Solis, Make Mines Safe: Fatalities Hit an All-Time Low Last Year but 
Coal Miners Need More Protection, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 28, 2010), 
http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/opinion/perspectives/make-mines-safe-fatalities-hit-
an-all-time-low-last-year-but-coal-miners-need-more-protection-230542/. 
 
I and MSHA Assistant Secretary Joseph A. Main are redou-
bling the department of labor’s commitment to ensure that every 
miner can return home at the end of every shift – safe and healthy. 
For only the second time ever, MSHA last year completed 100 per-
cent of its mandated inspections of all surface and underground 
mines. Robust hiring of mine inspectors will enable us to continue 
this. 
 
Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/1
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III. A Closer Analysis of Commission Proceedings 
 
A. How Cases Proceed Before the Commission 
 
Once a case reaches the Commission, it is assigned a docket number 
and referred to the Chief Administrative Law Judge (“Chief ALJ”).89 In 
some cases, the Chief ALJ will accelerate the decisional process by re-
viewing the case and issuing orders of settlement, dismissals, or de-
faults.90 After review by the Chief ALJ, cases are then referred to, and 
decided by, Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”).91 The ALJ then rules 
on motions, signs off on a settlement proposal, or schedules the case for 
hearing.92 If the parties are unhappy with the ALJ’s ruling, they can ap-
peal the decision to the Commission.93 The Review Commission is com-
prised of five members that provide an administrative appellate review of 
ALJ decisions.94 Afterwards, the parties can appeal Commission deci-
sions to the proper U.S. Court of Appeals.95 
There are six types of Commission proceedings: contesting the oc-
currence of the violation,96 disputing the amount of civil penalty assessed 
against the operator,97 alleging employee discrimination,98 arguing for 
temporary reinstatement,99 disputing the contents of an emergency re-
sponse plan,100 and compensation proceedings.101 The case backlog is 
fueled primarily by cases that contest the occurrence of the violation and 
the civil penalty assessed.102 These two categories comprise approxi-
mately 10,500 cases, or 63,000 separate violations of the Commission’s 
 
89. Strategic Plan 2007-2012, FED. MINE SAFETY & HEALTH REV. COMM’N, 
http://www.fmshrc.gov/plans/strategicplan121907.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. See 30 U.S.C. § 815(a) (2006). 
97. See id. 
98. See id. § 815(c)(2). 
99. See id. § 815(b)(2). 
100. See id. § 876(b)(2)(G). 
101. See id § 821. 
102. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & FED. MINE SAFETY & HEALTH REVIEW COMM’N, CASE 
BACKLOG REDUCTION PROJECT JOINT OPERATING PLAN 2 (2010) [hereinafter CASE 
BACKLOG REDUCTION PROJECT JOINT OPERATING PLAN], available at 
http://www.fmshrc.gov/jointoperatingplan.pdf. 
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docket, an overwhelming majority.103 
In a “contest” proceeding, the operator challenges the citation or or-
der before MSHA assesses a penalty.104 Essentially, the operator is at-
tacking whether the alleged conduct constitutes a violation.105 Once 
MSHA files an answer, the case is assigned to an ALJ.106 In civil penalty 
proceedings, the mine operator files a complaint with the Commission 
within thirty days of receipt of a civil penalty.107 The mine operator can 
contest some or all of the proposed penalty assessment.108 Here, the op-
erator is challenging the severity of the violation and the financial liabil-
ity that accompanies the assessment of penalty.109 Once MSHA receives 
notice, it notifies and provides the Commission and the operator with a 
“petition for assessment of penalty.”110 Once the operator receives the 
petition, the operator has thirty days to file an answer with the Commis-
sion challenging the proposed penalty assessment.111 It is important to 
note the operator must correct the alleged violation regardless of whether 
or not the operator appeals the alleged violation.112 Therefore, appealing 
violations does not by itself hamper or relieve the operator of its duty to 
comply with safety laws and regulations.113 
 
B. Implemented Procedural Improvements and Initiatives Aimed at Re-
solving the Case Backlog 
 
The Commission has taken several steps with Congressional support 
to reduce the case backlog and stem the tide of litigation.114 The Com-
mission received $3,800,000, available for one year to reduce and ad-
dress the case backlog.115 The Commission chose to allocate a large por-
 
103. Id. 
104. 30 U.S.C. § 815(d). 
105. See Guide to Commission Proceedings, FED. MINE SAFETY & HEALTH & REV. 
COMM’N, http://www.fmshrc.gov/guides/englishguide.htm#contest (last visited Nov. 12, 
2012). 
106. Id. 
107. 30 U.S.C. § 815(a). 
108. See Guide to Commission Proceedings, supra note 105. 
109. See id. 
110. Id. 
111. 30 U.S.C. § 815(a). 
112. See Guide to Commission Proceedings, supra note 105. 
113. See id. 
114. INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 26, 
at 2. 
115. Id. 
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tion of the funding toward hiring new personnel.116 Additional support 
staff, as well as six new ALJs, were hired.117 The Commission reported 
that additional staff and ALJs dedicated to reducing the case backlog 
have made a significant impact.118 
The Commission also explored the implementation of an electronic 
case management system.119 The Commission hopes to establish an elec-
tronic system that would allow the parties direct access online to file and 
manage all documents involved in a case.120 In March of 2011, the 
Commission reported to Congress, laying out the options, costs, and 
timelines associated with the project.121 Additionally, the Commission 
initiated several pilot projects aimed at increasing the use of technology, 
exploring e-filing, and identifying any possible barriers to technological 
improvements aimed at making the system more efficient.122 Further-
more, the Commission promulgated several new rules aimed at reducing 
the case backlog and facilitating the adjudicative process.123 In the fall of 
2010, the Commission published a final rule124 in order to streamline the 
settlement process.125 The rule makes case settlements more efficient and 
less time consuming by requiring parties to file a proposed decision with 
their settlement motions.126 Also, the rule requires that settlement mo-
tions and proposed orders be filed electronically.127 From December 
2010 through the end of 2011, over 7200 cases had been filed pursuant to 
the new rule and settled.128 
 
 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. FED. MINE SAFETY & HEALTH REVIEW COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FINAL 
REPORT ON THE TARGETED CASELOAD BACKLOG REDUCTION PROJECT 3 (2011) [hereinaf-
ter FINAL REPORT ON THE TARGETED CASELOAD BACKLOG REDUCTION PROJECT], availa-
ble at http://www.fmshrc.gov/4DOL_FMSHRC_report.pdf. 
119. See INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 
26, at 2. 
120. CASE BACKLOG REDUCTION PROJECT JOINT OPERATING PLAN, supra note 102, 
at 15. 
121. INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 26, 
at 2. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Penalty Settlement, 29 C.F.R. § 2700.31 (2012). 
125. INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 26, 
at 2. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 2-3. 
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Additionally, MSHA attempted to improve the review system and 
increase settlements by inserting conferencing opportunities at the begin-
ning of the formal review procedure.129 Due to the case backlog, MSHA 
relies upon its own employees to serve as Conference and Litigation 
Representatives (“CLRs”), rather than the attorneys in the Labor De-
partment Solicitor’s Office.130 Operators and MSHA attempt to work out 
settlements before investing too much in litigation.131 CLRs often request 
a ninety-day extension from the Commission to explore settlement.132 
Thus, a settlement may be reached before the issuance of the formal Peti-
tion for Assessment of Civil Penalty is filed and the case is subject to 
Commission procedures.133 
Despite MSHA and the Commission’s attempts to facilitate settle-
ment, this approach has been rife with difficulties, shortcomings, and 
conflicts. One issue that undermines the settlement procedure is that nei-
ther MSHA nor the CLR take into account what can or cannot be proven 
at trial.134 Instead, the government enters the process inflexible and gen-
erally unwilling to compromise.135 Consequently, unless the operator 
simply gives up or accepts liability, nothing of any real consequence gets 
resolved.136 Thus, the one mechanism that enables the parties to opt out 
of litigation and that should encourage communication is undermined by 
a general lack of good faith.137 “As a result, neither side can get serious 
until right before trial. That is when what can be proved becomes more 
important than insisting the inspector was right in [every aspect].”138 This 
type of procedure, without more safeguards and protections, only fuels 
the case backlog and operator frustration with the system, because the 
operator simply wants a fair review and possible modification or adjust-
ment of the possible violations and penalties.139 However, MSHA’s 
stance and position toward settlement serves an important function be-
cause it precludes regulatory capture and ensures compliance.140 
 
129. HEENAN, supra note 24, at 2-3. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. See id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. See id. 
138. Id. at 6. 
139. Id. at 2-3. 
140. Id. 
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In December of 2010, the Commission published a final rule, estab-
lishing a new simplified proceeding procedure in civil penalty cases.141 
On March 1, 2011, the simplified proceeding pilot program commenced 
for a period of nine to twelve months with the goal of streamlining the 
procedures for handling certain types of cases.142 Under the new rule, 
cases may be designated for simplified proceedings if the controversy in-
volves no fatality, injury, or illness.143 Additionally, such controversies 
are also characterized by one or more of the following: (1) contain only § 
104(a) citations; (2) require no special assessments; (3) lack complex is-
sues of law or fact; (4) involve a limited number of citations; (5) involve 
a limited penalty amount; (6) their prospective hearing will be only for a 
limited duration; (7) do not involve any questions of law; and, (8) do not 
require expert testimony.144 After applying the criteria, the ALJ deter-
mines whether the case is suitable for simplified proceedings.145 Addi-
tionally, either party can request a simplified proceeding,146 but if a party 
disagrees, it may opt-out.147 
After the ALJ designates a case for simplified proceedings, the at-
torneys must file a notice of appearance.148 However, an answer is not 
required.149 The parties then have forty-five days to provide the other 
with copies of all non-privileged documents, electronically stored infor-
mation, and any additional evidence used to support claims or defens-
es.150 Formal discovery is not permitted unless leave of court is grant-
ed.151 Once the documents are exchanged, the ALJ holds a pre-hearing 
conference in an attempt to reach a settlement, narrow the issues, make 
factual stipulations, establish defenses, and identify the planned witness-
es, exhibits, motions, and any other relevant matters.152 After completion 
of the pre-hearing conference, the ALJ schedules a hearing.153 However, 
 
141. Simplified Proceedings, 29 C.F.R. §§ 2700.100-2700.110 (2012). 
142. Presentation from Stephanie L. Ojeda, Dir., Alpha Natural Res., Coal Law 
Update at the EMLF Kentucky Mineral Law Conference, at 3 (Oct. 21, 2011). 
143. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.101. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. § 2700.102(a). 
146. Id. § 2700.103(a). 
147. Id. § 2700.104(b). 
148. Id. § 2700.102(c). 
149. Id. § 2700.102(d). 
150. Id. § 2700.105. 
151. Id. § 2700.107. 
152. Id. § 2700.106. 
153. Id. § 2700.106(b). 
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the ALJ who presides over the pre-hearing conference is conflicted out 
of the hearing.154 
In addition to the new rules, the Commission has implemented 
Global Settlement Conferences (“Global Settlements”).155 As an attempt 
to consolidate the docket and dispose of multiple cases at one time, the 
conferences group together multiple violations of one mine operator, 
mine, or law firm.156 The Commission then generates an order to the Sec-
retary and the operator, or operator representative, appears via telecon-
ference or in person to address those issues that can be settled.157 Settle-
ments reached at the conference are approved immediately.158 If some 
issues remain unresolved, they are assigned to an ALJ and placed on the 
docket.159 By employing this strategy, the Commission is able to resolve 
less complicated issues and reserve the hearing docket for more contro-
versial and complex matters.160 The Commission reported that during the 
period of April 29, 2011, through July 29, 2011, seventeen Global Set-
tlements were conducted, totaling ninety-nine cases including 854 sepa-
rate citations.161 Consequently, seventy-seven of those cases, totaling 706 
citations, were settled producing a seventy-eight percent success rate.162 
Also, in 2010, the Commission unveiled a plan to prioritize unde-
cided cases.163 The cases which received the highest priority involved 
“fatalities, injuries, flagrant violations, emergency response plans, and 
discrimination complaints.”164 Next, cases designated the second highest 
priority were calendar calls.165 Finally, the third category prioritizes cases 
by the date the initial pleading was filed.166 The Commission reported 
 
154. Simplified Proceedings, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,459-01 (Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codi-
fied at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2700). 
155. FINAL REPORT ON THE TARGETED CASELOAD BACKLOG REDUCTION PROJECT, 
supra note 118, at 6. 
156. See id. at 9. 
157. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.106(a). 
158. Id. § 2700.106(b). 
159. Id. 
160. FINAL REPORT ON THE TARGETED CASELOAD BACKLOG REDUCTION PROJECT, 
supra note 118, at 14-15. 
161. Id. at 7. 
162. Id. 
163. CASE BACKLOG REDUCTION PROJECT JOINT OPERATING PLAN, supra note 102, 
at 13-14. 
164. Id. at 13. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
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547 cases designated as priority cases.167 At year’s end, the Commission 
disposed of 308 of those cases, assigned 228 to ALJs, and had eight set-
tlement motions pending before the Chief Judge.168 
Similar to Global Settlements, the Commission has implemented a 
calendar call program as another tool to fight the case backlog.169 Calen-
dar calls are prioritized and organized around specific operators or geo-
graphic locations.170 Hearings are held in one location and occur sequen-
tially over the course of a week or two.171 Operators are able to attend 
multiple hearings in conjunction with one another in order to save time 
and resources, rather than attending different hearings in different loca-
tions.172 In its final report, the Commission reported that between April 
29, 2011, and July 28, 2011, twelve calendar calls were scheduled.173 
ALJs heard seventy-seven different cases, totaling 241 separate citations; 
consequently, sixty-four cases were resolved, totaling 211 separate cita-
tions.174 
The new regulations aimed at settlement and simplified proceed-
ings, as well as the other initiatives, are promising. In 2010, the Commis-
sion ALJs disposed of only 7132 cases, and the Commission initiatives 
resulted in 12,944 cases being disposed of in 2011.175 The Commission 
received approximately 10,600 new cases in 2011.176 The Commission 
estimated that each ALJ would dispose of approximately 450-500 cases 
per year.177 However, even with the new procedures and initiatives, the 
system is still largely inefficient at disposing of cases in a timely fash-
 
167. FINAL REPORT ON THE TARGETED CASELOAD BACKLOG REDUCTION PROJECT, 
supra 118, at 6. 
168. Id. Three cases had pending show cause orders because the operator failed to 
file a timely answer. Id. 
169. FED. MINE SAFETY & HEALTH REVIEW COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIRST 
QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT: TARGETED CASELOAD BACKLOG REDUCTION 4 (2010), 
[hereinafter FIRST QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT], available at 
http://www.fmshrc.gov/DOL_FMSHRCReport.pdf. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. CASE BACKLOG REDUCTION PROJECT JOINT OPERATING PLAN, supra note 102, 
at 7. 
173. FINAL REPORT ON THE TARGETED CASELOAD BACKLOG REDUCTION PROJECT, 
supra 118, at 7. 
174. Id. 
175. INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 26, 
at 3. 
176. Id. at 4. 
177. Id. 
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ion.178 In 2006, on average, cases were decided 188 days after Commis-
sion receipt, approximately a six-month adjudicative period.179 However, 
in 2011, cases were disposed of on average 524 days after receipt, or 
roughly an eighteen-month adjudicative period.180 In 2006, eighty-one 
percent of cases were decided within one year, compared to only thirty-
three percent in 2011.181 In 2006, only fourteen percent of the Commis-
sion’s cases were still pending after one year.182 That percentage roughly 
tripled in 2011 to forty-five percent.183 
The “additional staff and new backlog reduction initiatives” may 
have made modest gains in reducing the case backlog;184 however, the 
quicker disposal of cases and pressure placed upon ALJs to meet those 
goals have increased appeals to the Commission.185 The Commission 
primarily hears two types of appeals: (1) substantive cases and (2) de-
fault cases.186 Substantive cases are those in which an ALJ “issued a de-
cision on the merits and either a party has filed a petition for review with 
the Commission or at least two commissioners have decided to grant re-
view on their own initiative . . . .”187 Default cases are those contests 
“where [the] operator has failed to timely contest a proposed penalty or 
to respond the Secretary’s penalty petition and the operator has filed a 
motion to reopen the final order.”188 
In 2008, eight petitions for review of substantive cases were filed 
with the Commission, and only four were granted.189 In 2011, sixty-six 
petitions for review of substantive cases were filed with the Commission, 
and forty-three of such petitions were granted.190 Historically, less than 
fifty motions to reopen default cases were filed with the Commission.191 
 
178. See Reducing the Growing Backlog of Contested Mine Safety Cases Before the 
H. Comm. on Educ.& Labor, 111th Cong. 24 (2010) (statement of Cecil E. Roberts, Pres-
ident, United Mine Workers of America). 
179. INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 26, 
at 4. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. See id. at 3. 
185. Id. at 5. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
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Since 2008, approximately 200 motions to reopen default cases are being 
filed annually.192 Each default case petition is carefully reviewed by an 
Office of General Counsel (“OCG”)193 attorney advisor, who then pre-
pares a draft order for the Commission’s consideration.194 
While the Commission’s reforms and attempts to reduce the case 
backlog are commendable and have produced marginal results, their 
treatments and solutions only address the symptoms of the backlog and 
fail to adequately provide a cure to the underlying disease. Consequently, 
the number of cases pending before the Commission is approximately the 
same as it was in 2011,195 the year in which the rules for simplified pro-
ceedings became effective.196 Over ninety percent of the cases filed with 
the Commission eventually settle,197 which begs the question, why are so 
many cases being filed if the parties are willing to reach settlement? One 
answer: there is no legitimate escape valve for the parties during the liti-
gation process that allows for meaningful communication aimed at re-
solving disputes over mine safety, while still ensuring compliance and 
precluding regulatory capture. 
 
C. Proposed and Pending Solutions Focused on Solving the Case 
Backlog 
 
The demise of the traditional “Pre-Penalty Safety and Health Con-
ference” (“Pre-Penalty Conference”) is one catalyst fueling the case 
backlog.198 Before February 2008, MSHA held the Pre-Penalty Confer-
 
192. Id. 
193. Id. The OCG plays an important role in handling cases. The OCG is responsi-
ble for handling the initial legal research, preparing draft orders and opinions for the 
Commission, evaluating FOIA requests, as well as formulating and drafting the Commis-
sioner’s rules. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. See FED. MINE SAFETY & HEALTH REVIEW COMM’N, JUSTIFICATION OF 
APPROPRIATION ESTIMATES FOR COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 16 (2011). 
196. Id. at 11-12. 
197. Richard W. Manning, Admin. Law Judge, Fed. Mine & Safety Review 
Comm’n, Improving the Efficient Adjudication of Penalty Proceedings, Address Before 
the Energy & Mineral Law Foundation Special Institute on Mine Safety and Health Law 
(Mar. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Manning Address], available at 
http://www.emlf.org/Content/images/Speakers_Mine_Safety/3.%20Practicing%20Before
%20the%20ALJs/3.C.-Manning.FMSHRC.432030.pdf. 
198. Keith E. Bell, Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Civil Penalty Case Backlog 
from the Government’s Prospective, Address Before the Energy & Mineral Law Founda-
tion Special Institute on Mine Safety and Health Law (Mar. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Bell 
Address], available at 
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ence prior to the assessment of a civil penalty199 and Commission juris-
diction.200 At the conclusion of the Pre-Penalty Conference, MSHA 
would take into account any mitigating factors, extenuating circumstanc-
es, or modifications to the violations resulting from the conference.201 
Disputes that were resolved during the Conference did not require Com-
mission approval,202 and therefore, operators did not need to file as many 
cases with the Commission. However, MSHA eventually abandoned the 
Pre-Penalty Conference because operators were requesting conferences 
for every violation, abusing the system, and justified violations and pen-
alties were being unfairly compromised and settled.203 In March of 2009, 
MSHA implemented the “Enhanced Safety and Health Conference” 
(“Enhanced Conference”) to reduce operator abuse and prevent regulato-
ry capture.204 The significant change in the procedure required the opera-
tor to first contest the violations and penalties before it could request the 
Enhanced Conference.205 As a result, the operator is forced to file a claim 
with the Commission before it can attempt settlement with MSHA, thus 
fueling the current case backlog.206 As a result, once a claim is filed, the 
Commission is required to approve any “compromise, mitigation, [or] 
settlement.”207 Consequently, disputes that could have been settled with-
out Commission intervention require Commission action and clog up the 
docket.208 
For most of MSHA’s existence, the operator could easily request a 
Pre-Penalty Conference, and it would be granted.209 The parties could 
then meet informally and discuss the violations, corrective actions, miti-
 
http://www.emlf.org/Content/images/Speakers_Mine_Safety/1.%20Civil%20Penalty%20
Case%20Backlog/1.B.-Bell.Case.Backlog.pdf. 
199. Id. “Once the operator files its written notice to contest the proposed penalty, 
MSHA notifies the Commission and its jurisdiction is officially invoked over the case.” 
Baker, supra note 1, at 159. 
200. See Bell Address, supra note 198. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Rivlin Address, supra note 30, at 3-4. 
204. Bell Address, supra note 198. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. 30 U.S.C. § 820(k) (2006). 
208. See generally Pre-Hearing Conference, 29 C.F.R. § 2700.106 (2012). The new 
regulation has streamlined the settlement process and has resolved some of the case back-
log created because of the statutory requirement found in 30 U.S.C. § 820(k) that requires 
Commission approval of all settlement agreements reached between MSHA and the op-
erator. 
209. See HEENAN, supra note 24, at 2-3. 
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gating factors, and any modifications to the violations. The process was 
not a hearing, but an opportunity for MSHA to review its own actions as 
well as educate the operator on safety compliance.210 Both parties wel-
comed the process, and for most operators, “this was all the review [and 
due process] they felt they needed.”211 However, once the Enhanced 
Conference was implemented, the process naturally propelled both par-
ties toward litigation and undermined the parties’ ability to communicate 
with one another.212 Today, operator requests for conferences are often 
met with “[a] conference [that] will be scheduled after . . . penalties . . . 
have been assessed. . . . Failure to timely contest the proposed penalties 
will result in your conference request being cancelled.”213 In the end, the 
one procedural mechanism that encouraged communication and promot-
ed settlement was replaced by formal, time-consuming, and costly litiga-
tion initiated before the Commission.214 Elimination of the Pre-Penalty 
Conference “has made formal contests the only reliable avenue for dia-
logue.”215 
All the parties concerned agree the best approach would be to hold 
the Safety and Health Conference before the penalty is formally contest-
ed before the Commission.216 However, in order for the change to be ef-
fective, a dialogue and willingness to cooperate must be fostered be-
tween the parties without compromising safety. On August 20, 2010, 
MSHA unveiled a pilot mediation program to help stem the tide of legal 
contests.217 MSHA’s goal was to “alter [the] safety and health confer-
ences so that mine operators can informally dispute citations before filing 
a formal appeal with the [Commission].”218 
 
 
 
 
 
 
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 2. 
212. Id. at 3. 
213. Id. at 3 (internal quotations omitted). 
214. Rivlin Address, supra note 30, at 5. 
215. HEENAN, supra note 24, at 3. 
216. See generally id. 
217. Victoria VanBuren, US MSHA Unveils Pilot Mediation Program, 
MEDIATE.COM, http://www.mediate.com/articles/BayerKbl20100830b.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2012). 
218. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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On November 28, 2011, MSHA released its evaluation of the pilot 
mediation program.219 The program yielded modest success as sixty-
seven percent of the violations that went to conference were settled, 
while thirty-three percent were eventually contested to the Commis-
sion.220 MSHA estimated that pilot conferences reduced the case backlog 
by up to seventeen percent.221 Interestingly enough, MSHA reported the 
parties found the process improved communication and, overall, the par-
ties were pleased with it.222 The stakeholders reported the conferencing 
procedure was useful and felt it would decrease the number of violations 
contested in the long term.223 A majority of participants stated they did 
not intend to litigate issues discussed in the conference.224 MSHA’s plan 
is to institute the Pre-Assessment Safety and Health Conference (“Pre-
Assessment Conference”) in every district by March 2013.225 
However, a closer examination of the new Pre-Assessment Confer-
ence reveals some troubling trends. First, the new conferencing proce-
dure is eerily similar to the one abandoned by MSHA in 2008, which en-
abled too many abuses and had become largely ineffective.226 Further, 
the new procedure is optional and ninety percent of contested violations 
did not use the conferencing procedure.227 Of those responding to the 
survey, operators reported that they did not conference because there 
were dissatisfied with previous results, while some stated they contested 
violations automatically based on the proposed penalty amount.228 Final-
ly, the process and procedure is still controlled by MSHA and presents a 
clear lack of impartiality.229 CLRs are MSHA employees and “operators 
stated that they felt that the person conducting the conferences should be 
 
219. MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EVALUATION OF 
MSHA’S PRE-ASSESSMENT SAFETY AND HEALTH CONFERENCING PILOT 1 (2011) [herein-
after HEALTH CONFERENCING PILOT], available at 
http://www.msha.gov/PreAssess/PreAssessConfEval2011.pdf. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. See id. 
223. Id. at 9. 
224. Id. at 10. 
225. See Letter from Kevin G. Stricklin, Adm’r, Coal Mine Safety & Health, to 
Neal H. Merrifield, Adm’r, Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety & Health (Dec. 20, 2011) 
(on file with author). MSHA has not universally instituted this conference framework at 
the time of publication. 
226. See HEALTH CONFERENCING PILOT, supra note 219. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 7. 
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independent from the district management and allowed to make deci-
sions at the conference in order to speed up the conferencing process.”230 
As a result, several additional ideas have been floated to help im-
prove the negotiation and settlement process.231 First, allow mini-trials 
where the parties could only call one witness and exhibits would have to 
be submitted in advance of the hearing.232 Second, allow more simplified 
written submittals of positions, as well as stipulations, to resolve more 
issues before trial.233 
Interestingly enough, some have called for a formal mediation pro-
cess and procedure as a solution to the case backlog.234 While in the theo-
retical sense this is a well-reasoned solution, there are numerous ques-
tions that remain unresolved and that must be addressed if the mediation 
process is going to serve as a real solution to the current stalemate. When 
is the most opportune time to conduct the mediation? What DSD will be 
adopted and is the most effective at reducing the case backlog as well as 
addressing the underlying conflicts? What type of mediator style will 
best facilitate the process and increase the chances of success? Addition-
ally, how can a mediation process be implemented that encourages coop-
eration and compliance without sacrificing miner safety? In the end, a 
Commission-mandated mediation process offers a solution to reducing 
the case backlog, creates a system that encourages cooperation and col-
laboration toward miner safety, and prevents regulatory capture. 
 
IV. Considerations for Designing a Mandatory Mediation System and 
Its Impact on the Case Backlog 
 
A. Benefits of Mediation and Why the Process Works 
 
The benefits of mediation in lieu of litigation are widely accepted 
and understood within the legal community. Attorneys and judges have 
embraced mediation as an effective alternative to traditional litigation 
that generally yields a result both parties find amenable. While the popu-
lace may be unfamiliar with the intricacies of the mediation process, 
more and more participants in the judicial system are finding their dis-
 
230. Id. 
231. HEENAN, supra note 24, at 6. 
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putes resolved through this important system. 
Mediation accelerates and facilitates possible settlement. In fact, 
ninety-five percent of cases filed in the California state judicial system 
eventually settle before trial.235 Some cases settle early and some settle 
on the eve of trial; however, the key difference between the former and 
latter is the amount of time, resources, money, and psychological toll one 
is willing to invest or sacrifice in the process.236 In many cases, the sim-
ple process of telling one’s story to a mediator facilitates the settlement 
process.237 One important advantage of mediating disputes is avoiding 
the financial burden associated with litigation.238 The cost of mediation 
generally pales in comparison to the cost incurred through the life of a 
lawsuit.239 While cost and outcome are important considerations, there 
are other benefits that are generated from the process. For example, an 
intangible benefit of mediation is that it fosters an environment that en-
courages and promotes communication in lieu of litigation tactics that 
often undermine and serve as impediments to communication.240 
Additionally, in most states and mediation systems, “what takes 
place in mediation is confidential.”241 Generally, mediators cannot be 
forced to testify about communications during the mediation process.242 
Also, offers, counter-offers, and concessions are confidential if the case 
does not settle in mediation.243 While there are some exceptions, parties 
to the most typical forms of dispute over money and negligent conduct 
are generally protected by confidentiality laws.244 
“The American Arbitration Association [(“AAA”)] reports that over 
[eighty-five percent] of all mediations result in . . . settlement.”245 
Whereas settlement offers during the litigation process may be perceived 
as showing weakness, mediation provides a secure environment for ne-
 
235. Adrienne Krikorian, Litigate or Mediate?: Mediation as an Alternative to 
Lawsuits, MEDIATE.COM, http://www.mediate.com/articles/krikorian.cfm (last visted Feb. 
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236. See id. 
237. Id. 
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Inherent Conflict of Interest?, 32 UCLA L. REV. 986, 1005-07 (2004). 
241. Krikorian, supra note 235. 
242. Id. 
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245. Michael Roberts, Why Mediation Works, MEDIATE.COM, 
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gotiation.246 Mediators provide structure to the communication process 
and aid in avoiding unproductive discussions.247 Next, hard bargaining 
and posturing are reduced or eliminated during the mediation process.248 
Instead of each party focusing on the differences in their positions, medi-
ation provides an opportunity to seek common ground and agreement.249 
Further, mediation brings together the decision makers who are essential 
to reaching a settlement.250 During mediation, each party has an oppor-
tunity to be heard, present information, educate, and provide a realistic 
viewpoint unfiltered by lawyers or precluded by the fog of litigation.251 
Also, mediation provides the parties with a realistic assessment of their 
case’s strengths and weaknesses.252 Finally, the mediator can aid the par-
ties in generating options for settlement instead of getting bogged down 
with legal and factual issues.253 
 
B. Dispute System Designs, Mediator Approaches, Defining the Prob-
lem, and the Benefits of Third Party Designed Mandatory Media-
tion Systems 
 
There are several different DSDs and mediation styles that one must 
consider when designing and participating in a mandatory DSD. Based 
on today’s political and budgetary constraints, and the economic feasibil-
ity of working within the existing regulatory and procedural framework, 
some DSDs, styles of mediation, specific mediators, and styles of negoti-
ation may not be well-suited or practical in addressing the case backlog 
in a timely and cost-effective format. Therefore, I only provide a brief 
overview of different DSDs, mediator approaches, and the benefits of 
mandatory mediation. 
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1. Dispute System Designs 
 
DSDs vary from giving the disputant full control to very little con-
trol over the system.254 One key factor affecting DSDs and their success 
depends on who is exercising control during and over the process.255 
Three key components to consider when designing a DSD or selecting a 
DSD are: “1) who is designing the system, 2) what are their goals, and 3) 
how have they exercised their power [during the process].”256 Tradition-
ally, public civil justice system mediation has been designed by a third-
party DSD, provided by the courts, through the support of the legislature 
and for the benefit of the disputants,257 whereas private justice systems 
developed mediation DSDs to resolve contract disputes, labor grievanc-
es, and other commercial issues.258 
Mediation DSDs can be categorized as one-party, two-party, or 
third-party DSDs.259 One-party DSDs are a newly emerging trend where-
by one party to the conflict has superior economic power and designs the 
entire system through which the conflicts are mediated.260 Under this 
method, the party who designs the system generally has complete control 
over it.261 More often than not these DSDs create restrictive outcomes, 
such as binding arbitration.262 
Two-party DSDs bring the parties together to design a system that 
will hopefully resolve their conflict.263 These systems are generally seen 
as fair and efficient ways to resolve conflicts.264 They are usually tailored 
to address specific disputes that might arise and are most often seen in 
private international commercial arbitrations.265 Such systems also occur 
 
254. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Dispute System Design and Justice in Em-
ployment Dispute Resolution: Mediation at the Workplace, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2009). 
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260. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Sys-
tems for Managing Conflict, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 23 (2008). 
261. See id. at 23-24. 
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gal Infrastructure, Economic Development, and Dispute Resolution, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE 
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where the parties are “repeat players,” such as those participating in labor 
relations and collective bargaining.266 
Again, this analysis primarily focuses on a public DSD adopted by a 
third-party for the benefit of the disputants and, in this case, an adminis-
trative adjudicative process. Due to existing regulatory and legislative 
constraints, mandated one-party or two-party designs are not practical or 
workable solutions without significant Congressional and regulatory re-
form. 
 
2. Mediation Styles and Approaches 
 
A mediator’s approach to dispute resolution typically falls some-
where on a continuum from an evaluative approach on one side to a more 
facilitative role on the other.267 A mediator who utilizes the evaluative 
approach generally “intend[s] to direct some or all of the outcomes of the 
mediation.”268 Using this strategy, the mediator “help[s] the parties un-
derstand the strengths and weaknesses of their positions and the likely 
outcome of litigation.”269 The evaluative mediator typically stresses his 
education and experience and provides an in-depth review of court doc-
uments, pleadings, and evidence.270 At the outset of the mediation, the 
mediator allows each party to present their case and positions.271 Most 
discussions take place in private caucuses where the mediator is able to 
employ his evaluative techniques.272 Finally, the mediator pushes the par-
ties toward settlement in hopes of arriving at a “position-based compro-
mise agreement.”273 
By providing assessments and direction, the evaluative mediator 
removes some of the parties’ decision-making powers.274 In some in-
stances, this allows the parties to reach settlement more efficiently.275 
However, the evaluative approach may undermine settlement because the 
neutrality of the mediator can come into question and the parties’ flexi-
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bility and decision-making power is limited.276 
However, the facilitative mediation approach fosters a more com-
municative style between the parties, allowing each party more opportu-
nities to express differing viewpoints.277 Additionally, the mediator en-
hances the communication between the parties by helping them 
determine the outcome.278 Typically, parties will make opening remarks 
and statements and caucuses are conducted during the process.279 How-
ever, the focus of the mediation is not on the legal merits of the dispute 
or on the mediator’s knowledge, but instead on the parties’ underlying 
needs and how they can be met through an interest-based settlement, and 
therefore, the mediator generally avoids case evaluation.280 Finally, the 
facilitative model supports brainstorming and suggests options for reach-
ing settlement.281 
The facilitative model can offer certain advantages if the parties are 
capable of understanding opposing interests and developing solutions.282 
This model provides the parties with more control over the process, the 
decision-making, and the agreement.283 Finally, this system offers greater 
opportunities for the parties to educate one another about different view-
points, interests, and positions.284 In the end, the process should help the 
parties’ future ability to work together.285 
 
3. Mediator Experience, Expertise, and Impartiality 
 
In the design of a dispute resolution system, consideration must be 
given to the mediator’s level of knowledge, expertise, and experience. 
Ideally, the mediator should have expertise in both the subject-matter of 
the dispute, as well as the mediation process.286 However, combining 
those two characteristics are not always feasible. “Subject-matter exper-
tise [is defined as a] substantial understanding of . . . administrative pro-
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280. See id. 
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cedures, customary practices, or technology associated with the dis-
pute.”287 Subject-matter expertise generally increases in proportion to the 
parties’ needs for evaluation.288 Therefore, parties looking for an evalua-
tive approach will most likely prefer a mediator with a strong back-
ground in the disputed subject-matter.289 For instance, parties looking to 
propose new government regulations may want a mediator who under-
stands that particular area of administrative law and procedure.290 Con-
versely, parties capable of understanding the problems, issues, and work-
ing toward their own agreement may want a mediator with greater 
knowledge of the mediation process and procedure.291 
Impartiality is also essential to the mediation process and its suc-
cess.292 When the parties desire a more evaluative approach, the need for 
actual impartiality, or the perception of impartiality, generally increas-
es.293 Therefore, a system that utilizes an evaluative approach must use 
mediators who remain impartial throughout the process and gain the trust 
of the parties.294 However, when the parties desire a facilitative approach, 
the neutrality of the mediator is less essential to the process, due to the 
decision-making ability and creativeness given to the parties.295 
 
4. Defining the Problem and Focusing the Mediation 
 
Defining the problem, and the vast expanse between narrowing the 
issues and broadening the result, are other considerations the parties and 
mediator must determine in the process.296 A narrow problem-definition 
generally increases the efficiency of mediation and the chances for set-
tlement.297 This is accomplished by limiting the number of issues and in-
cluding only relevant information, thus avoiding the pitfalls of a broader 
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approach.298 However, this narrow approach can increase the possibility 
of impasse because it limits the decision-making of the parties and their 
creativity toward designing a settlement agreement.299 
In contrast, a broad problem-definition approach can facilitate an 
agreement that addresses the parties’ underlying issues.300 Also, broaden-
ing the problem can increase the likelihood of settlement because it per-
mits party creativity and increases the range of possible solutions to the 
problem.301 However, this approach can have the opposite effect; by 
broadening the problem, the likelihood of impasse can increase, thereby 
increasing time and expense required for mediation.302 
 
5. Mandatory Mediation Viability and Success 
 
Third-party designed mandatory mediation as an avenue for settling 
disputes has proved itself successful in some of the most contentious 
arenas. For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) extensively mediates discrimination claims303 and has one of 
the largest programs for workplace mediation. The program consists of a 
staff of internal mediators, as well as “external mediators as independent 
contractors.”304 Every mediator receives training in mediation, as well as 
EEOC laws, and generally uses an evaluative approach in aiding resolu-
tion.305 
There have been several studies on the EEOC mediation process 
and its success.306 In 1994, 267 exit mediation surveys and 125 mail sur-
veys showed that sixty-six percent of the charging parties and seventy-
two percent of the supervisors were “satisfied with the process and out-
come.”307 Furthermore, ninety-five percent of the parties reported that 
they “trusted the mediator,” and roughly eighty-four percent of the 
charging parties and supervisors stated that they would use mediation 
 
298. Id. 
299. Id. at 43. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. 
302. Id. 
303. Blomgren Bingham et al., supra note 263, at 17. 
304. Id. at 18. 
305. Id. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/1
BAKER MACRO Final 7/26/2013 4:31 PM 
2013] MANAGED COOPERATION POST-SAGO 521 
again.308 In 2000, a study of over 11,700 EEOC mediations, revealed that 
“[ninety-one percent] and [ninety-six percent] of charging parties and 
supervisors respectively would use mediation again.”309 Such a high rate 
of satisfaction evinces that, in the end, the third-party DSD performed 
well in handling and resolving discrimination complaints within the 
workplace.310 In fact, the studies showed the parties generally perceived 
the process as fair given the fact it was designed by authoritative third-
parties and not by one disputant, whereas a one-party design carries a 
higher burden to establish fairness for the disputants.311 
Another example of a successful mandatory mediation emerged at 
the turn of the twenty-first century, when the mortgage meltdown put the 
country into recession.312 As the financial crisis continues, mandatory 
mediation will become a viable solution for resolving foreclosures be-
tween banks and homeowners.313 In fact, twenty-one states now offer 
some form of mediation that allows the homeowners to negotiate with 
the bank in hopes of finding a faster remedy.314 Six states offer an auto-
matically-scheduled mandatory mediation process and fifteen states offer 
an opt-in mediation process once the lending institution initiates the fore-
closure process.315 Those states offering automatic scheduling reported a 
seventy-five percent participation rate,316 whereas those states providing 
opt-in mediation reported a participation rate below twenty-five per-
cent.317 Due to the high participation rate, many opt-in states are begin-
ning to switch to mandatory mediation,318 because success and settlement 
is premised upon participation and good faith. Courts, states, and gov-
ernments can mandate participation, but they cannot legislate good faith. 
Despite the mandatory nature of the process, homeowners reached a set-
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tlement seventy to seventy-five percent of the time, with sixty percent of 
homeowners being able to stay in their homes.319 Thus, the mandatory 
requirement did not serve as a large impediment to settlement or negoti-
ating in good faith. 
In some states, mandatory mediation has yielded positive results in 
one of the most contentious arenas of dispute: domestic relations.320 Be-
ginning in 2005, the State of Utah launched a mandatory mediation pro-
cess.321 Once an answer is filed in a contested divorce case, “all remain-
ing contested issues are referred to [mandatory] mediation.”322 “Parties 
are required to participate in at least one session” before their case can 
move forward, unless the parties are excused for good cause.323 Utah 
states that mediation is appropriate in domestic conflicts because “it en-
courages collaborative problem solving by the parties . . . [and] offers an 
environment well-suited to identifying and addressing the strong emo-
tional issues associated with divorce and parenting conflicts.”324 Most 
importantly, Utah notes that mediation allows the parties to find solu-
tions to their own disputes, resolves cases more quickly, requires less ex-
penses, and promotes relationships and communication.325 While this ra-
tionale may over-simplify the benefits of mediation, those principles are 
nonetheless legitimate and serve as influential motivating factors. 
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V. Creating a Post-Litigation Mandatory Mediation Process at the 
Commission Level 
 
A. The Mandatory Mediation Procedure and Designing the System 
 
First, the split-enforcement model adopted by Congress in the 1970s 
serves a very critical purpose in ensuring mine safety and precluding 
regulatory capture. However, under today’s high-stakes litigation, the 
system is inefficient and ineffective. The proposed system and process 
not only improve efficiency and outcomes, but can be done in such a way 
as to preclude regulatory capture. The procedures for contesting cases 
before the Commission must be amended and adapted if the system is 
going to be saved. Therefore, not only is the mandatory mediation pro-
cess essential to saving the split-enforcement model and solving the case 
backlog, establishing a mandatory mediation process within the current 
procedures for contesting mine safety violations is practical, efficient, 
and should be embraced by all the parties. It is unreasonable to think that 
to prevent regulatory capture a system must preclude all cooperation and 
communication. On a basic level, both the system and safety are im-
proved if the regulator and regulated can communicate and work toward 
a common goal: safety. Mandatory mediation with Commission over-
sight facilitates this goal and permits managed cooperation. 
Clearly, the Commission has launched numerous initiatives to ad-
dress the case backlog. Some of these programs have created a partial es-
cape valve to traditional litigation, but have failed to bring about the 
types of substantive changes and reforms needed to overhaul an over-
whelmed system. While the split-enforcement model326 stymies regulato-
ry capture, it was never intended to handle the volume of litigation that 
exists today due to increased penalties, violations, and court challenges. 
The split-enforcement model still offers a viable blueprint for the effi-
cient administration of justice, as well as an essential check on the regu-
lator-regulated relationship; however, it must be amended and updated to 
function in today’s high-stakes litigation world. As it stands, the Com-
mission has implemented simplified proceedings, Global Settlements, 
calendar calls, and new rules to expedite the settlement process, all in an 
effort to reduce the case backlog. Recently, MSHA announced they 
planned to turn back the clock and institute the new Pre-Assessment 
Conference, which is eerily similar to the old Pre-Penalty Conference. 
 
326. See 30 U.S.C. § 811(a) (2006). 
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The new Pre-Assessment Conference presents many of the same com-
plaints, conflicts, and abuses as the old conferencing process. 
The reforms have yielded modest results and the data suggests that 
ninety-six percent of cases eventually settle at some point during the liti-
gation process.327 However, a mandatory mediation process at the onset 
of litigation would yield even better results in a more efficient time 
frame, while improving the split-enforcement model. The characteristics 
of mediation not only encompass most of the Commission’s goals in one 
avenue, but more importantly, create a dialogue that should reduce the 
amount of cases being filed in the future. If more than ninety percent of 
the cases eventually settle, why not capitalize on that fact by offering 
parties one clear, efficient, and fair alternative at the beginning of the lit-
igation process, rather than years into the process? 
Under the proposed mandatory mediation process, much of the 
Commission’s procedures already allow for a smooth transition into a 
clear and effective alternative to litigation. Currently, each case is as-
signed a docket number when it reaches the Commission by the Chief 
ALJ.328 The Chief ALJ could still accelerate the process by ruling on or-
ders of settlement, dismissals, or default judgments.329 Under the media-
tion system, the Chief ALJ’s authority would remain unchanged and both 
of these procedural steps would remain intact. 
However, instead of the Chief ALJ referring each case to an ALJ for 
a contested proceeding, the Chief ALJ would refer every case to manda-
tory mediation. There, the parties would have to participate in at least 
one mediation session before being allowed further access to the courts. 
Similar to Utah’s mandatory mediation process implemented in domestic 
relations cases,330 a good cause exception would be available to the par-
ties to opt out of the mediation procedure. However, that exception must 
be rarely granted and zealously guarded in order for the mediation pro-
cess to produce the desired outcomes. If mediation is unsuccessful, the 
parties would then find themselves back in the throes of formal litiga-
tion—an all too familiar place. In the end, a mandatory mediation system 
would capitalize and streamline many of the programs and initiatives al-
ready implemented by the Commission. 
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B. Mediating the Dispute 
 
1. The Mediator’s Approach 
 
While establishing a mandatory escape valve for the parties is 
achievable, understanding who will mediate the disputes and their role 
and style in the process is a much different consideration. Will the medi-
ator offer an evaluative or facilitative approach? What is each mediator’s 
expertise and knowledge about mining, technology, and mine safety? 
How will impartiality be established and maintained? All these consider-
ations will have a very important impact on the process and its long-term 
success. 
Ideally, in this third-party designed system, an evaluative approach 
would offer the most effective and efficient style for the parties, as well 
as for remedying the backlog. The evaluative style would allow the me-
diator the opportunity to help each party understand their case’s strengths 
and weaknesses. As it stands, there is already a relatively ineffective con-
ferencing system at the beginning of the litigation. Under the current ap-
proach, MSHA relies on its own employees to serve as CLRs and facili-
tate settlement.331 The CLRs request a ninety-day extension from the 
Commission in hopes of reaching settlement.332 However, this process 
has been somewhat ineffective and undermined because CLRs and 
MSHA fail to consider what can or cannot be proven at trial.333 The re-
ports suggest that all too often, when MSHA enters the process, they are 
inflexible and unwilling to compromise; thus, the operator becomes frus-
trated and effectively withdraws from the process.334 
An evaluative approach and style would solve both of these issues. 
First, the process is undermined because the regulator is also serving as 
the mediator, and therefore, there is a clear absence of impartiality. Thus, 
the operator enters the process with hesitation and distrust. Secondly, 
there is no objective party offering insight into strengths and weaknesses 
of the government’s case. A simple glance at this quagmire shows that 
any opposing party should not serve as both the regulator and mediator in 
the same proceeding. Thus, an evaluative approach by an independent 
third party produces impartiality, as well as important perspective about 
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each case’s strengths and weaknesses, and thereby helps the parties edu-
cate each other and make more informed decisions. 
Also, an evaluative approach would provide an in-depth review of 
court documents, pleadings, and evidence. Ideally, the mediator should 
stress his experience with mine safety and the regulatory climate, so as to 
establish his credibility with the parties and help facilitate settlement. 
This will have the intended effect of pushing the parties toward settle-
ment in a more efficient manner and arriving at a position-based agree-
ment. Unlike parties unfamiliar with the system and enthralled in an 
emotional tug of war, both MSHA and the operator are complex parties 
and are very knowledgeable with the subject matter, law, and process. 
Therefore, a successful system should adopt an evaluative approach be-
cause settlement will be more position-based, rather than interest-based. 
 
2. Disputant Communication 
 
One frustration expressed by operators under the current procedural 
framework is an inability to have their voice and concerns heard about 
MSHA’s enforcement of higher penalties, inspections, and violations. As 
the system stands now, this opportunity does not transpire until much lat-
er in the process after the parties are well into the litigation process. An 
evaluative approach at the outset of the case would permit each party the 
opportunity to make opening statements and present their positions. 
However, most of the discussions and negotiations would still take place 
in private caucuses, and therefore, allow the mediator an opportunity to 
employ evaluative techniques. One weakness of the evaluative approach 
is that this direction and control can end in impasse because the parties 
have diminished control over the process and decision-making power. 
However, regardless of which style is employed, the parties already have 
diminished control over the process because the regulations and rules 
control the parameters around settlement, and the Commission controls 
the ultimate outcome because it must approve every settlement agree-
ment.335 
Also, substantive communication between MSHA and the operator 
is a real source of frustration that fuels the current backlog. This point is 
bolstered by MSHA’s recent evaluation of the pilot mediation program 
where the parties reported that the process “improved” communica-
 
335. 30 U.S.C. § 820(k) (2006). 
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tion.336 Within the current stalemate, there is a very real interest-based 
component as some operators choose to spend more capital on litigation 
than the actual penalty itself. Thus, a facilitative approach could offer 
each party more opportunities to communicate. However, within the cur-
rent regulatory framework, the legal merits control the outcome and the 
parties are extremely limited as to their settlement options, both from a 
regulatory and practical perspective. Therefore, the constraints surround-
ing settlements squarely restrict interest-based settlement options. Thus, 
a facilitative approach would create a self-defeating strategy and result. 
The facilitative model would improve communication; but, at the end of 
the process, the law and Commission restrict the parties’ ability to be 
creative about settlement. Therefore, an evaluative approach is simply 
more realistic and practical. This approach would provide a chance to 
improve and facilitate a dialogue, but still arrive efficiently at position-
based settlement agreements. 
 
3. Mediator Expertise and Impartiality 
 
Another consideration is the mediator’s approach, expertise, and 
impartiality. The importance of these characteristics must be instilled in 
the mediator and become a benchmark of the process if this proposed 
system is truly going to serve as a legitimate solution to the case backlog. 
In the current regulatory environment, and with the technological and 
safety issues associated with mining, the mediator must possess a high 
level of “subject-matter expertise.” In order for the parties to receive a 
legitimate evaluation of their case, the mediator must understand the 
complexities of mining and the challenges facing regulators. 
The parties will require a high-level of “subject-matter expertise.” 
One practical and efficient option would be to employ retired ALJs, so-
licitors, or attorneys with extensive legal experience in this area of the 
law to serve as mediators.337 Beneficially, the mediators would require 
little training as to the nuances of mine safety and current administrative 
law issues.338 However, formal mediation training would be a worthwhile 
and critical investment for the program’s success.339 Instead of the 
Commission hiring more ALJs and staff to promote litigation, the money 
 
336. HEALTH CONFERENCING PILOT, supra note 219, at 9. 
337. Baker, supra note 1, at 174. 
338. Id. 
339. Id. 
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could more wisely allocated toward hiring, retaining, and training media-
tors, similar to the staff mediators found within the EEOC process.340 
Quicker judgments simply do not get to the heart of the problem and 
merely treat the symptoms. Thus, only a system that enables managed 
cooperation and communication, while not sacrificing safety, offers a re-
al solution. 
Also, by retaining retired ALJs, solicitors, and attorneys to serve as 
third-party neutrals, impartiality becomes achievable and transparent. 
Impartiality is essential to the success of an evaluative approach. Under 
the current conferencing systems, impartiality is limited, and through no 
individual’s fault, undermined. First, during the conferencing opportunity 
at the outset of the formal review procedure, the CLRs are MSHA em-
ployees.341 Thus, the process is automatically tainted and a shadow is 
cast over any attempt at impartiality. While the CLR has admirable goals 
and works hard to facilitate settlement, this conflict of interest under-
mines the process. Additionally, the system places the CLR in a difficult 
position, attempting to negotiate settlement agreements without under-
mining safety, and in the end both parties wind up in unworkable situa-
tions. This is evidenced by MSHA’s recent evaluation concerning the pi-
lot mediation program that showed that operators in cases involving 
ninety percent of the contested violations did not participate in the op-
tional conference.342 Operators clearly stated that one reason they avoid-
ed the conference is because the CLR is not an independent third par-
ty.343 The process requires an independent third party. 
Alternatively, if a case is not resolved during this initial conferenc-
ing opportunity or in MSHA’s new Pre-Assessment Conference, it may 
be designated for a simplified proceeding.344 During this process, the 
ALJ holds a pre-hearing conference in an attempt to reach settlement.345 
The ALJ who presides over the simplified proceedings is conflicted out 
of the actual proceeding, precluding the obvious conflict.346 However, on 
a macro scale, the dual role each ALJ is required to fulfill affects percep-
tions of their impartiality. 
 
340. See Blomgren Bingham et al., supra note 263, at 18. 
341. HEENAN, supra note 24, at 6. 
342. HEALTH CONFERENCING PILOT, supra note 219, at 6. 
343. Id. at 10. 
344. Simplified Proceedings, 29 C.F.R. §§ 2700.100-2700.110 (2012). 
345. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.106. 
346. Simplified Proceedings, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,462 (Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 
29 C.F.R. pt. 2700). 
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It would be naïve to ignore that each ALJ most likely has specific 
perspectives and ideas regarding mine safety, enforcement, and an opin-
ion as to what or who is fueling the backlog. Obviously, the parties are 
aware of these realities from their own knowledge and experience. Re-
gardless of one’s perspective on the best course for mine safety, the reali-
ty is that both conferencing opportunities are undermined by either the 
appearance of a lack of impartiality or the actual lack thereof. By retain-
ing and hiring experienced third-party neutrals outside of MSHA and the 
Commission, impartiality will improve, as well as each party’s contribu-
tion to the process and eventual outcome of the conference. 
Finally, experienced mediators who can offer an evaluative ap-
proach, defining the problem and narrowing the issues, will create more 
efficiency and facilitate settlement. By narrowing the issues, a mediator 
may avoid many of the pitfalls that accompany a broad problem ap-
proach. Although narrowing can result in impasse, while broadening is-
sues may address underlying sources of disagreement, here the parties 
enter the process knowing the limitations of the settlement process. In 
most cases, the operator is contesting the level of the violations and 
points assigned to each of them. Thus, the regulatory regime and frame-
work place extreme limits on creativity, providing clear parameters 
around settlement. 
 
C. Embrace of the Mandatory Mediation Process and Why It Will 
Work 
 
1. Allocation of Resources and the Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Parties should embrace a mandatory mediation process because they 
are already mediating most of their disputes in one form or another. In 
fact, the Commission’s statistics show that matters referred to Global 
Settlements settled seventy-eight percent of the time.347 The same source 
reveals that ninety percent of all cases eventually settle before trial,348 ev-
idencing the fact the parties want off the “litigation highway.” Addition-
ally, MSHA’s new Pre-Assessment Conference witnessed violations set-
tle sixty-seven percent of the time, even though only ten percent of 
 
347. FINAL REPORT ON THE TARGETED CASELOAD BACKLOG REDUCTION PROJECT, 
supra note 118, at 7. 
348. Id. 
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operators chose to participate.349 In an attempt to resolve the current 
backlog, the Commission has adopted a buffet-style approach to the 
problem. Currently, the Commission offers an assortment of settlement 
proceeding options: expedited settlement process in some situations,350 
while less-complex issues are designated for simplified proceedings.351 
Meanwhile, conferences are requested by the CLRs at the case’s onset,352 
and Global Settlements are held to resolve numerous issues that one law-
yer, firm, mine, or coal operator has pending with the Commission.353 A 
calendar call system organizes cases geographically.354 Each of these 
procedures and/or programs is geared toward the central goal of forcing 
the parties to resolve their issues without resorting to the long, expensive, 
and winding road of litigation. However, instead of the current buffet ap-
proach adopted by the Commission, why not have one process and a sin-
gle “escape valve” to which the parties are referred to resolve their con-
flicts and get out of the litigation gridlock? Further, many of the existing 
programs and procedures could still be utilized during the mediation pro-
cess. 
If ninety percent of the cases settle at the Commission level,355 one 
central issue that bears uncovering is: why do these cases settle? The 
main difference between a case that settles during the initial conferencing 
opportunity at the formal outset of the case,356 and one settling on the eve 
of trial, is the amount of time, resources, and money invested or sacri-
ficed during the case. One central benefit of a mandatory mediation pro-
cess at the outset will be the financial savings reaped by both parties. Ex-
trinsically and practically, coal operators and companies are driven by 
profits, shareholders, and production. Logically, a process that offers le-
gitimate cost savings, while not sacrificing due process rights or disad-
vantaging either litigant, and most importantly, not sacrificing safety, 
should be embraced by the parties. Many operators feel as if they do not 
have a voice or believe that their concerns about MSHA’s oversight and 
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regulation go unheard until too late in the litigation process.357 A formal 
mediation process at the outset allows for critical dialogue between the 
operator and MSHA. 
There is little room for debate that federal revenue is and will con-
tinue to shrink, and that austerity measures are most likely on the hori-
zon. MSHA and the government spend countless resources, time, and 
money litigating issues that could be more efficiently resolved. Obvious-
ly, with a shrinking federal budget leading to reduced resources being 
made available for MSHA, the organization would directly benefit from 
reducing these expenses. This would allow MSHA to allocate their lim-
ited resources instead toward better training of mine inspectors, increas-
ing mine inspection time and visits, and working with operators to im-
prove mine safety. While some may take the contrary position, there is 
no correlative support for the notion that mine safety is somehow im-
proved by the amount of time spent within the administrative courtrooms 
found within the Beltway. Instead, mandatory mediation offers both par-
ties a chance to resolve disputes while working within the confines of the 
split-enforcement model. The proposed system improves both coopera-
tion and safety at the same time. 
Further, by hiring and retaining retired ALJs, attorneys, or solicitors 
to serve as mediators, the current Commission ALJs would have more 
time to hear the more contentious and important cases. Mediation would 
save vital Commission resources currently directed toward ad hoc pro-
grams meant to plug the proverbial “holes in the dike.” The pressure to 
dispose of cases quickly, and the incentive to meet arbitrary guidelines 
set by bureaucrats, would be replaced by a sense of full adjudication and 
an attention to detail. Thus, for those parties who could not resolve their 
disputes in mediation, the litigation process and result would yield a 
more substantive and meaningful outcome. 
 
2. Managed Communication and Cooperation 
 
Importantly, mediation promotes communication, whereas hardball 
litigation tactics often undermine and impede this essential function. We 
want a certain amount of adversarial proceedings and positions in the 
regulatory process to ensure compliance and safety, and clearly, regula-
tory capture has been a detriment to mine safety. However, the Commis-
sion sponsored mandatory mediation process offers a rare opportunity to 
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promote managed cooperation and improved communication, without 
sacrificing safety. Instead of each side being solely focused on the zero-
sum game of winning in litigation, mediation would foster greater com-
munication and collaboration toward a common goal: improving safety. 
In the current litigation-based model, communication is almost non-
existent. One positive yielded by the pilot mediation program is that, 
overall, the parties reported that the process improved communication.358 
Surely, some form of communication and collaboration must take place 
between the regulated and regulator in order for the regulatory frame-
work to work effectively. It is simply wrong to think that any form of 
collaboration and communication between the parties is detrimental to 
safety, and instead, only leads to abuse. 
A mandatory mediation process would force the parties to the table 
with the hopes that civil discourse and open communication between 
them would resolve a legitimate portion of the conflicts that are currently 
overwhelming the system. While Congress cannot legislate good faith or 
discernment, mechanisms can be put in place that will foster and ensure 
these goals. As with most mediation procedures, rules could be put in 
place that promote and ensure open and effective communication. Also, 
negotiations would remain confidential and mediators would be preclud-
ed from testifying at trial. In the end, a system is created that allows the 
operator and MSHA to arrive at a neutral table for meaningful discourse 
without sacrificing safety. The Commission would still be charged with 
approving all settlement agreements and would have authority to reject 
unjust settlements and abuse. 
 
3. Mandatory Mediation Success 
 
Cost savings and improved communication will go a long way in 
resolving the backlog and restoring faith in an otherwise damaged pro-
cess. Further, statistics show that mandatory mediation is successful and 
the parties are generally pleased with the process and outcomes. The 
1994 EEOC study detailing the mandatory mediation process found that 
over sixty-five percent of the parties were pleased with the process, nine-
ty-five percent of the parties trusted the mediator, and over eighty per-
cent reported that would use mediation again.359 The 2000 study revealed 
that over ninety percent of the parties would use mediation again to solve 
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their disputes.360 Therefore, imposing mandatory mediation on MSHA 
and the operator will likely produce favorable results. 
Similar to the EEOC third-party designed process, whereby most 
participants found the process fair because it was designed by a third-
party and not by the disputants, a mediation system established by the 
Commission aimed at resolving disputes should help establish fairness 
and credibility with the parties. While some may argue the process will 
produce more meaningful results if the parties chose mediation, a low 
participation rate would likely nullify the processes’ ability to resolve the 
backlog. One fundamental flaw with MSHA’s new Pre-Assessment Con-
ference is that only ten percent of parties participated in the process, 
while ninety percent of parties chose to litigate.361 Commission backed 
opt-in procedure will not produce the type of results needed to resolve 
the backlog. Additionally, as the state mortgage mediation programs 
show, participation rates in mandatory mediation programs are signifi-
cantly higher than opt-in programs. Consequently, opt-in states are be-
ginning to switch to mandatory participation mediation.362 
In fact, seventy to seventy-five percent of homeowners reached set-
tlements with their banks in the mandatory mediation states.363 This out-
come can be attributed to a whole host of factors, but one factor that re-
lates closely to the current case backlog is the cost-benefit analysis that 
should be conducted by the operator and MSHA. First, mediation is a 
much more cost effective choice for foreclosing banks than paying vo-
luminous amounts of attorneys’ fees and court costs. Also, it makes more 
financial sense for the bank to work out a compromise with the home-
owner and recoup a larger percentage of the loaned capital, rather than 
continuing to flood the market with foreclosed properties and recoup 
even less of their initial capital investment. 
The same principles rings true for the homeowner who compromis-
es with the bank and recoups part of her investment, instead of walking 
away with nothing. Additionally, the often times desperate or frustrated 
homeowner has a voice and decision in the outcome, instead of simply 
allowing the case to proceed until foreclosure. These same principles and 
motivating factors apply to the relationship between MSHA and the op-
erator. These controlling principles should override most of the initial 
skepticism or concerns the parties have regarding the new mandatory 
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mediation program. A mandatory mediation process serves as a cost sav-
ings to both parties, but just as important, provides the parties a voice 
and input in the final outcome. 
No matter how successful the program, there will be those partici-
pants who do not want to participate, try to undermine the process with 
dilatory tactics, or act in bad faith. In fact, the AAA reported that even in 
those cases where one party did not want to participate in the mediation, 
forty to fifty percent of those cases still resulted in settlement.364 Thus, 
even in those situations where one participant did not want to participate, 
almost half of those cases still reached settlement. Therefore, regardless 
of whether or not the proposed mandatory mediation program yields a 
seventy-five percent success rate or a forty percent success rate, the suc-
cess rates illustrate that a mandatory program at the Commission level 
would work. 
A real concern that must be factored into the process is those indi-
viduals who simply want their day in court. Obviously, there will be cir-
cumstances where MSHA or the operators choose litigation. While this 
will always be an issue, and especially true for conflicts involving emo-
tionally charged issues or controversies such as domestic relations or 
employee-employer based conflicts, here, the parties consist of the gov-
ernment and corporations. Therefore, while emotions are still running 
high, emotional decision-making in this process should be reduced be-
cause of the parties’ beginning positions. 
Finally, a successful mandatory mediation program will not only re-
duce the case backlog and expedite matters in the future, it will also re-
duce the amount of cases filed. As a dialogue begins and communication 
improves, conferencing opportunities before Commission jurisdiction 
will benefit from improved communication. Additionally, by installing 
the process at the Commission level and requiring Commission approval 
of all settlement agreements, an environment of managed cooperation 
can be achieved that enhances safety and precludes regulatory capture. 
Therefore, disputes between MSHA and the operator can be successfully 
resolved, and in the end, an environment can be fostered that promotes 
collaboration and cooperation towards the goal of mine safety. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
A civil penalty system should encourage cooperation and compli-
ance. In this context, the split-enforcement model has become ineffective 
in today’s litigation environment. While the split-enforcement model 
serves an important function, it must be amended to meet the problems 
inherent to the current climate. A Commission mandated mediation pro-
cess will create an environment of managed cooperation with vital over-
sight. At the same time, it will improve communication and collaboration 
between the parties. Mediation offers an efficient, cost effective option to 
traditional litigation. It will not only help resolve the case backlog, but it 
should be embraced by the parties because, in most instances, they are 
already settling cases in one of the varying programs and formats offered 
by the Commission. The new process will not only benefit the parties 
and the Commission, but will help spark a renewed focus, energy, and 
collaboration towards a common goal: safety. 
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